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ABSTRACT:
In this paper, the relationship between economic growth and public debt is revisited using a
panel VAR. The focus is on the Eurozone and the time horizon starts when the Euro was
introduced. The three main results of the study are: (i) public debt harms economic growth and
growth leads to decrease in debt, (ii) spillover effects of public debt and economic growth
between core and periphery countries in the Eurozone are found and (iii) the periphery
countries respond more to internal and external shocks than the core countries.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis and the the following debt crisis in the Euro area gave rise to the fear that
the monetary union could collapse and that some countries have to pay the debt of others.
This fear continues to shape the political discussions about public debt and the economic
policy measures in the Eurozone. Painful austerity programs were introduced during the
financial crisis. However, a negative effect of debt on growth is highly disputed and there are
contradicting results in the literature. Keynesian theory suggests that the government should
spend more during a recession in order to create demand and stabilise the economy. But such a
credit-financed expansionary fiscal policy was not possible in the Eurozone. If this is justified
is controversial.
This paper aims to contribute to the discussion about the effect of public debt in the
Eurozone. A panel vector autoregressive (VAR) study is conducted with the 11 founding
members of the Eurozone and Greece. The time horizon starts after the introduction of the
Euro, so quarterly data from 2000 until 2018 is used. In a first step, the average effect of debt
and growth and vice versa is estimated and in the second step, inflation, long- and short-term
interest rates are included in the model to analyse the interactions of these five variables. The
third estimation analyses the effects between debt and growth for the core and the periphery
countries separately. In the last step, spillover effects between core and periphery countries are
estimated.
The main findings of the paper are that an increase in debt leads to a decrease in growth and
an increase in growth leads to a decrease debt. A debt-to-GDP shock of 1% leads to 0.2% less
economic growth A second result is that core and periphery countries are highly interrelated
and shocks in one part of the Eurozone are transmitted to the others. A debt-to-GDP shock of
1% in the periphery countries implies 1% less growth in the core countries one year later, while
a debt-to-GDP shock of 1% in the core countries implies 4% less growth one year later in the
periphery countries. The third and last result is that the periphery countries respond more to
shocks in the core area, as seen above, but also to shocks in their own area. A debt-to-GDP
shock of 1% implies 0.33% less growth in the periphery countries and debt-to-GDP shock of
1% implies only 0.05% less growth in the core countries.
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This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. As in [Lof and Malinen, 2014] a
panel VAR approach is used, but this study includes three other endogeneous variables: Long-
term interest rates are included because theoretically high debt leads to higher interest rates
and that depresses growth. The short-term interest rate is included, because it reflects the
monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) and it is also a benchmark for other
interest rates. Inflation is supposed to account for the heterogeneities in the monetary union.
Also [Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012] focus on the Eurozone and includes additional
variables, but the authors use a panel data approach, which might suffer from endogeneity
due to simultaneity or reversed causation and thus, the effect of debt on growth is likely to be
overstated. Furthermore, the authors have a longer time horizon, while this study focuses only
on the time when the Euro was introduced. In addition, the spillover analyses between periphery
and core countries contributes to the existing literature.
This paper is organised as follows: In the second part of this section, the literature review is
presented. In the next section, the data and in the third section the methodology is explained. In
section four, the empirical results are presented followed by a section that summarises various
robustness tests. Section six discusses and concludes.
1.1 Literature review
The first groundbreaking publication in this debate about the debt and growth nexus is
[Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010]. At the beginning of the debt crisis, they found a threshold of a
debt-to-GDP ratio of 90%, beyond which growth slows down quicker. For many politicians,
this was a proof that austerity programs are justified. But the famous team from Havard made
mistakes, which questioned the credibility of their results. These famous mistakes released a
huge debate in academia.
The main critics are about the methodology that [Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010] used and relate
to their data selection. [Herndon et al., 2014] find striking methodological errors and accuses
them of choosing a certain selection of countries and time periods that supported their results.
[Egert, 2015] tests the hypothesis of a non-linear relationship, but he cannot find a robust non-
linear relationship in his model. [Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015] show the difference between
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countries and argues that there is no general threshold which is true for every country, because
countries are very heterogeneous.
[Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012] support the hypothesis of a threshold. The authors
conduct a microeconometric panel data analysis and finds a threshold in the Euroarea. The au-
thors of the highly disputed publication also published a revised paper, so [Reinhart et al., 2012]
study episodes of high public debt and find that in these periods, growth is low.
Some authors do not find an effect. They argue that many studies suffer from endogeneity
and especially from reversed causation. [Pattillo et al., 2011] find that studies, which suffer
endogeneity tend to overstate the negative effect of debt. [Lof and Malinen, 2014] conduct
a panel VAR analysis and the authors find an impact of growth on debt, but not vice versa.
Correlation is undeniable, but if causation exists is disputed. [Panizza and Presbitero, 2014] try
to answer this question by using an instrumental variable for debt that does not effect directly
economic growth. But they cannot find an answer.
As mentioned above, this study complements the study by [Lof and Malinen, 2014],
because the additional variables inflation, long- and short-term interest rates are included and
it complements the study by [Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012], because here a macroe-
conometric rather than a microeconometric tool is used. For the spillovers, a methodology
inspired by [Bhattarai et al., 2018] is used.
2 Data
The two main variables of interest are debt and growth, so the debt-to-GDP ratio and the growth
rate of GDP from the same quarter last year is used. From the literature it is already known
that this effect is either hard to detect or maybe not existing, so other variables are included
that could be either channels through which debt affects growth or play an important role in
the interrelations. To complement the study inflation, long-term interest rate and short-term
interest rate are included. Inflation can capture heterogeneities, which are usually reflected in
the exchange rates and the monetary policy, but this is not possible in a monetary union. The
long-term interest rate is selected because it shows the risk assessment of the ability of a country
to pay back its credit. In theory, higher debt leads to a higher risk to be able to pay it back and
7
thus to higher long-term interest rates. Similarly, a higher risk of default could unsettle investors
and thus, could harm growth. The short-run interest rate reflects the decisions of the ECB, so it
is interesting to investigate the reactions of the monetary policy.
The dataset is extracted from Eurostat. The time frequency is quarterly and the horizon is
from the first quarter in 2000 to the first quarter in 2018. Seasonally and calendar adjusted data is
used. The study focuses on the Eurozone, where the following 12 countries provided sufficient
data: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherland, Portugal and Spain. The relatively short time period is compensated with the
panel dimension. Comparing to other studies, one advantage here is that only the contemporary
dynamics are analysed. The only structural breaks in the data are the financial crisis and the
following debt crisis. All countries were founding members of the Eurozone, except Greece
that entered in 2001. So, the dynamics of the named countries are analysed, since they are in
the Eurozone. This is interesting, because the Eurozone membership has overall a strong impact
on the macroeconomic situation of a country.
In the panel dimension, all five variables are stationary and thus, there are no cointegration
relationships possible. The results of the Granger causality tests support the choice of a VAR
model, because between all variables exist granger causality at least in one direction. The
complete results of the Granger causality tests are reported in table 5 in the appendix.
3 Methodology
The available dataset consists of five endogenous variables of 12 countries. In order to use all
the available information, a panel VAR model is chosen. In a VAR, the time series of a set
of endogenous variables is analysed. The panel analysis adds the cross-sectional dimension,
which are here the 12 countries. One big advantage of this method is that even a relatively
small time horizon can be compensated by the panel dimension and thus the resulting dataset is
rich enough.
Following [Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013] a panel VAR has three main characteristics: cross
sectional heterogeneity, dynamic interdependencies and static interdependencies. Cross-
sectional heterogeneities are unit specific intercepts and slope coefficients. In this study, the
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only cross-sectional heterogeneity are the country fixed effects. Since all countries are in a
monetary union, relatively strong homogeneity is assumed and furthermore, the main interest
of the study is the average effect in the Eurozone. In a model with dynamic interdependencies,
in every equation for every country the lags of all variables of every single country would be
included. For the same reason as before, dynamic interdependencies are excluded here. Static
interdependencies are the cross-sectional correlation of the error terms. This interdependency
exists in the model and can be used for a spillover analysis.
The panel VAR model can be written as following:
Yit = A0 + A1Yit−1 + A2Yit−2 + A3Yit−3 + A4Yit−4 + uit (1)
with i = 1, ..12 countries and t = 1, ...73 moments in time. Yit is a vector that contains the
endogenous variables of every country and the vector Yit−1 contains its lags. The error term uit
can be decomposed in uit = it +αi, where it is independent and identically distributed and αi
represents the country fixed effects.
The equation shows again that there are no intercept and slope hetergeneities, because A0
and A1 are not unit specific. The only unit specific element is the country fixed effect αi.
Furthermore, for country i no variables of other countries enter the regression, so there are no
dynamic interdependencies in the presented model. The error terms of the different units are
correlated, so Cov(uit, ujt) 6= 0 if i 6= j. These covariances of the errors of different units are
the static interdependencies.
3.1 Estimation
In a microeconometric framework, fixed effects would be the appropriate method, because every
country would have a country-fixed effect which is correlated with the explanatory variables and
thus not random. But in a dynamic panel with a relatively small time horizon the estimators are
biased, see [Nickell, 1981]. Additionally, in a VAR, every variable is both, independent and
dependent. It follows that the fixed effects would be correlated with both, the independent and
the dependent variables and this would again lead to inconsistent results.
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Instead, the model explained above can be estimated by a General Method of Moments
(GMM) estimation, where instruments are used to have sufficient moment conditions for the
feasibility of the estimation. The GMM estimation can be extended to the system GMM
estimator. This method estimates all equations at the same time and in order to do that it
uses additionally moment conditions that are constructed with information of the series in
levels. These additional information lead to a better performance of the system GMM estimator
comparing to the normal one. Another main advantage of the system estimator is that a constant
can be included. Additionally, in the estimation one can use the collapse option, which allows
that not the full set of instruments has to be used and thus, to reduce the number of moment
conditions. This reduction makes large estimations feasible.
Nevertheless, the fixed effects need to be eliminated. In the GMM estimation, there are
two alternative methods to do so. One method is applying first difference (FD) and because
αi is time independent, its first difference is zero and thus, the individual effect is removed.
One disadvantage of this method is that serial correlation is induced in the error term, because
for example ∆it = it − it−1 and ∆it−1 = it−1 − it−2 are apparently serial correlation,
even though the untransformed errors were not. The second method is the forward orthogonal
deviations (FOD) transformation. Here, one has to take the average of all future observations
and subtract it from the current value. Again, the fixed effect is eliminated, because it is constant
in time and thus the average of all future observations is equal to every single observation. In
the FOD, the last value is dropped, because it has no future observation. In contrast to the
FD transformation, where the first value is dropped, because it has no previous observation.
Because the FD method introduces serial correlation, the FOD method will be used in this
paper. The resulting model then is given by:
∆Yit = A1∆Yit−1 + A2∆Yit−2 + A3∆Yit−3 + ...+ AT∆Yit−T + ∆it (2)
where ∆ represents either the first difference or the forward orthogonal deviation.
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3.2 Model specification
Two different models will be specified and analysed: A two-variate model with GDP growth
and debt-to-GDP ratio and a five-variate model that includes additionally the variables inflation,
long-term interest rate and short-term interest rate.
For the lag selection, the Model and Moment Selection Criteria are used. Following
[Andrews and Lu, 2001], the Akaike information criterion is not consistent here, so the
Bayesian and the Hannan-Quinn information criteria are used. Since the data are quarterly,
four lags should always be preferred. In both models, four lags are choosen here, because even
though one lag has the lowest information criteria, the information criteria of four lags lies not
far apart.
3.3 Identification
The estimated models are reduced form panel VARs. The shock of each variable in a reduced
form VAR is not distinguishable. Thus, the structural form of the model is needed in order
to identify the shocks. The estimates of the reduced form do not have enough information to
recover the entire structural form, so restrictions are needed to fully identify the shocks.
For the identification, the Cholesky approach is used here. In the Cholesky identification,
the variables have to be ordered recursively. The variable ordered first is the most exogenous
one or in other words, this variable is not influenced contemporaneously by the shocks of the
other variables. The variable ordered last is the most endogenous one and thus, it is influenced
by shocks of all other variables contemporaneously.
In this study, the order of [Caldara and Kamps, 2008] is followed. The authors argue
that government spending has to be ordered first, because there exists a delay between the
political decision and the actual spending, so it can affect other variables immediately, but
it can only be affected with a lag. Output is ordered second, because its reaction is slower
than inflation. Inflation is ordered third and the interest rates are the most endogenous
variables, so they are ordered last. [Lof and Malinen, 2014] also uses the argumentation of
[Caldara and Kamps, 2008] and applies it to a panel VAR with debt-to-GDP ratio ordered first
similar to government spending and GDP growth ordered second similar to output. The authors
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test the robustness of the result with a reversed identification order and with the debt level
instead of the debt-to-GDP ratio and they find that the order has no substantial effect on the
results. In this study, different orders are also tested and the results are indeed the same.
4 Estimation results
In the following two subsections the impulse response functions (IRFs) and the forward error
variance decomposition (FEVD) of the two-variate and the five-variate model are presented.
The IRFs show the reaction of a single shock. The FEVD shows where the reaction of one
variable comes from and thus, complements the structural analysis. In the FEVD, all shocks
happen at the same time and the reactions to the different structural shocks are revealed.
The third subsection presents the cross-country heterogeneity analysis and subsection four the
spillover analysis.
4.1 Two-variate model
Figure 1: IRFs of debt and growth
(a) Reactions to a debt shock (b) Reactions to a growth shock
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
Figure 1 shows the IRFs of debt and growth to a debt and a growth shock. The first result is
that all IRFs are significant. An increase in debt leads to a decrease in growth and an increase
in growth leads to a decrease in debt. So, the variables are affecting each other significantly.
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While the effects on debt are very persistent, the growth rate converges after two and a half
years back to its initial level. Only after around 70 years, debt is completely back at its steady
state level, so it is highly persistent.
The finding that a growth shock leads to a persistent decrease in debt is reasonable, because
when GDP growth increases unexpectedly, the revenues of the government also increase and
thus, it can repay its debt. The persistency is also intuitive, because once a portion of the
debt is paid back, the level stays lower. On the other hand, an increased level of debt shocks
the economy temporary, because for example public investment is crowded out, interest rates
are rising and private households decide to save more and spend less. In the next periods, the
government does not demand new credit anymore, so interest rates decrease again, there is again
more credit supply and private consumption increases again, so the economy gets back to its
initial level.
Table 1: FEVD 2-variate model
debt2gdp gdp growth
steps debt2gdp gdp growth steps debt2gdp gdp growth
1 1.00 0.00 1 0.07 0.93
2 0.98 0.02 2 0.11 0.89
... ... ... ... ... ...
7 0.81 0.19 7 0.26 0.74
8 0.79 0.21 8 0.26 0.74
... ... ... ... ... ...
20 0.76 0.24 20 0.26 0.74
In table 1, the FEVD, so the contributions of both shocks to the movement of debt and of
growth are shown. By construction, debt is only moved by its own shock in the first period,
because it is ordered first in the Cholesky identification. Vice versa, debt does effect growth
contemporaneously, in the first period, 7% of the movement of growth is explained by the debt
shock. For both variables, the share of the shock of the other variables increases in the next
periods. After two years, the contribution of debt for growth is around 26%. This contribution
is constant until the last period, which is period 20 or rather after 5 years. The contribution
of growth for debt is 21% after two years. This contribution increases slightly and in the last
period it reaches 24%.
13
4.2 Five-variate model
In this section, only the responses of debt and the reactions on a debt shock will be presented,
which are the main contributions of this paper. The complete results can be looked up in figure
7 in the appendix.
Figure 2: IRFs to a debt shock
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
Figure 2 shows the reactions to a debt shock. Again, the reaction of debt is very persistent
and growth decreases, but the effect vanishes after two years. These effects are similar, but
slightly smaller than in the two-variate model. The reaction of inflation is not significant. In a
monetary union, this is expected, because inflation can only be influenced by the central bank
and thus, it is quite exogenous for the members of the Eurozone and cannot be used to repay
national debt. The function for the member states could be to balance out different levels of
competitiveness. The reaction of both interest rates is significant. Long-term interest rates
increase due to the debt shock. One reason can be that higher government debt makes the
government bonds riskier, because the repayment can be more difficult. In the EU, it could also
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be that a higher level of debt leads to a political conflict with the EU and thus, the risk to leave
the EU increases and thus, bond prices increase. Another reason can be that credit demand
exceeds supply and thus, the price rises. Short-term interest rates decrease with a debt shock.
Since the short-term interest rate indicates the monetary policy reaction, this could be the case
because the ECB could try to provide liquidity to the market when long-term interest rates and
maybe also other interest rates rise because of a debt shock. Another explanation could be that
government debt are seen as safe assets and thus, when banks have more safe assets, they are
also willing to lend more to each other.
Table 2: FEVD from debt in 5-variate model
steps gdp growth inflation long-t. interest rate short-t. interest rate
debt2gdp
1 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.02
2 0.09 0.00 0.2 0.03
... ... ... ... ...
7 0.20 0.02 0.06 0.07
8 0.20 0.02 0.07 0.08
... ... ... ... ...
20 0.20 0.06 0.09 0.13
Table 2 shows how much the debt shocks contributes to the movements of the other four
variables. Debt is ordered first in the Cholesky decomposition and thus, it influences all other
variables contemporaneously. The biggest contribution of debt is on growth. Already in the
first period, 6% of the movement of growth comes from debt, the contribution increases in the
next periods and then stabilizes at a contribution of 20%, similar to the two-variate model. In
addition, debt contributes around 7% or rather 8% to the interest rates in the end of the second
year. For the short-term interest rate, this influence increases up to 13% in the last period.
Similar to the non-significant IRFs of inflation, the contribution of debt to the movement of
inflation is with around 2% tiny, but also increasing up to 6% in the last period.
Figure 3 shows the reaction of debt to the shocks of the other four variables. Similar to the
two-variate model, a growth shock leads a decrease in debt. With an inflation shock, the reaction
of debt is not significant. As explained above, this is a reasonable result. A positive shock of the
long-term interest rate leads to a significant increase in debt. The reasoning behind that reaction
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Figure 3: IRFs of debt
(a) Reaction to a growth shock (b) Reaction to a inflation shock
(c) Reaction to a long-term interest rate shock (d) Reaction to a short-term interest rate shock
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
is that higher long-term interest rates make debt more expensive and thus, debt increases. Since
the shock is unexpected, the government can not plan on it and decide to spend less. It has
to bear the increased costs, because its decisions are slower than the market. The reaction of
the short-term interest rate is ambiguous and only little significant. Firstly, it decreases, after
around two years it starts to increase again and after three years it passes the steady state level
and keeps increasing. Higher interest rates in the money market restrict the governments ability
to borrow, this could be the reason behind the first decrease. Once the money market is back to
its equilibirum, the higher costs of borrowing could be reflected in the increased debt-to-GDP
ratio.
Table 3 presents the FEVD of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Because of the Cholesky identfication,
only in the fifth period all five variables contribute to the movement of debt. Debt is
contemporaneously only affected by itself and every period one more variable enters. The
short-term interest rate is the last one that enters in period five. The main contribution comes
still from growth, but the influence of the long-term interest rate increases over time. In the last
period, so after 5 years, it reaches 17%, which is the same size of the contribution of growth.
Interestingly, the contribution of growth is almost the same as in the two variate model while
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Table 3: FEVD of debt in 5-variate model
debt2gdp
steps debt2gdp gdp growth inflation long-t. interest rate short-t. interest rate
... ... ... ... ... ...
5 0.85 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.01
6 0.81 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.01
7 0.78 0.16 0.02 0.03 0.01
8 0.76 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.01
... ... ... ... ... ...
20 0.64 0.17 0.02 0.17 0.00
the contribution of debt itself decreased in the five-variate model. So, one can conclude that the
contribution of growth is quite robust, while the contribution of debt on itself captures also the
effect of other variables. The contribution of inflation and short-term interest rate is tiny and
constant.
Table 4: FEVD of growth in 5-variate model
gdp growth
steps debt2gdp gdp growth inflation long-t. interest rate short-t. interest rate
... ... ... ... ... ...
5 0.17 0.76 0.00 0.04 0.02
6 0.19 0.73 0.01 0.06 0.02
7 0.20 0.70 0.01 0.08 0.02
8 0.20 0.68 0.01 0.09 0.02
... ... ... ... ... ...
20 0.20 0.64 0.01 0.13 0.02
Table 4 shows the FEVD of growth. Remarkably, it looks pretty similar to the FEVD
of debt in many ways. Inflation and short-term interest rate have as well a very tiny and
constant contribution. The long-term interest rate has also an increasing contribution, while
its contribution is only 4% in the fifth period, it increases until 13% in the last period. The
contribution of debt decreased from around 26% in the two-variate model to around 20% in the
five-variate model. Overall, the FEVD shows that above all the long-term interest rate is an
important variable in the debt growth nexus, because it contributes largely to the movement of
both.
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4.3 Heterogeneities
In the models above, a sufficient homogeneity of the countries is assumed. In order to check if
there are nevertheless different dynamics among the countries, the same estimation is conducted
for two different groups of countries: the core and the periphery countries. Here, as periphery
countries are classified Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The core countries are the other
eight countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands.
Figure 4: IRFs of periphery and core countries separately
(a) Periphery countries: Reaction to a debt shock (b) Core countries: Reaction to a debt shock
(c) Periphery countries: Reaction to a growth shock (d) Core countries: Reaction to a growth shock
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
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Figure 4 shows the estimated IRFs of the periphery and the core countries. At first sight,
the graphs look pretty similar, which supports the assumed homogeneity. Though, the scale is
quite different. The shocks of the periphery countries are slightly bigger and the reactions are
much bigger. So, the periphery countries respond more to unexpected shocks, while the core
countries seem to absorb the shocks better. Nevertheless, the assumed homogeneity holds.
4.4 Spillovers
Another interesting question is if a shock in a certain area of the Eurozone affects another area.
For example if the debt crisis in the periphery countries affected the core countries of the Euro
area.
There are two different methods to find out about the spillover effect. One method is to look
at the covariances of the residuals of the different countries. As mentioned above, the correlation
of the spillovers are static interdependencies and here, besides the fixed effect, they are the only
heterogeneities allowed in this model. One disadvantage of this model is the fact that they are
static, so no dynamics of the spillovers are captured. Another disadvantage is that they are
hard to interpret, because there are covariances between all 12 countries for all variables. The
second and more convenient method is to include the structural error of a variable of one group
of countries as an additional variable in the estimation of another group of countries, inspired
by the method of [Bhattarai et al., 2018].
This second method will be used in this study. There are two groups of countries: the
periphery and the core countries. In a first step, a panel VAR for the two groups is estimated
separately. Then, the residuals of both panel VARs are identified. The structural error of debt
and growth is obtained for both groups. In the second step, the two structural errors of the core
countries are each included in a new panel VAR estimation of the periphery countries and vice
versa.
Figure 5 shows the IRFs the debt and growth spillovers from the periphery to the core
countries and figure 6 the spillovers from core to periphery. In both estimations, the reactions
of debt and growth to all spillovers are significant. As in the section about cross-country
heterogeneities, the IRFs show similar patterns at a first sight, but the scale of the periphery
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Figure 5: Spillovers from periphery to core countries
(a) Reaction to a debt shock in the
periphery countries
(b) Reaction to a growth shock in the
periphery countries
Figure 6: Spillovers from core to periphery countries
(a) Reaction to a debt shock in the
core countries
(b) Reaction to a growth shock in the
core countries
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
countries is again much bigger. The differences are even more striking in this spillover analysis
than in the simple cross-country heterogeneities analysis. It is a strong result, that even these
pretty different groups in the Eurozone are highly interrelated and shocks in certain areas are
transmitted to others. The second important result is that periphery countries respond more to
shocks in their own area but also to shocks outside the periphery.
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5 Robustness
To increase the credibility of the results various robustness tests are conducted for both models,
the small one with two variables and the big one with five variables. Overall, the results are
very robust.
One concern of the study is the mechanical effect of GDP growth on the debt-to-GDP ratio.
To avoid it, the study was performed with the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio in order to eliminate
the mechanical effect. Additionally, the same study is conducted with logged GDP instead of
GDP growth rate and logged debt instead of the debt-to-GDP ratio. The resulting IRFs are
the figures 12 to 18 in section 7.4 in the appendix. Especially the two-variate model is pretty
robust and the results do not change. The five-variate model shows less significant IRFs with
the logged data, but the results are still robust. A second disputatious point of this study is the
identification strategy, because the order of the variables is based on assumptions. However,
other identification orders do not change the results. In the study, a constant for all countries
is included in addition to the fixed effect. Excluding this constant does not change the results
either. Also annual data leads to similar results.
There are two types of government debt: general government debt and central government
debt. As the name suggests, general government debt is broader and includes all gross
government debt. Central government debt does not include the debt of the governments of
states and departments, additionally, social security funds are neither included. In the study,
general government debt is used, but using central government debt does not change the results.
The last robustness check is controlling for other dynamics in the data. In order to control
for time effects, a dummy variable which equals one during the crisis is included in the model.
The real effective exchange rate can be used to control for external competitiveness, to avoid
endogeneity, the first lag is included as a control. The controls are included as exogenous
variables in the estimation. The results are again similar.
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6 Discussion
This paper studies the dynamics of sovereign debt in the Eurozone. The main contributions
are that only the Eurozone is studied, that the empirical model is a VAR and that the variables
inflation, long- and short-term interest rate are additionally included in the model. Moreover,
the spillover analysis contributes to the literature. There are three main results of this study.
The first two results are that an increase in growth decreases debt and an increase of debt also
decreases growth. So, it is not a one-way relationship, as assumed in many microeconometric
models in the literature, but a two-way causality. The finding that higher growth leads to a
decrease in debt is quite intuitive, but the alarming result is that an increased level of debt really
harms growth. There are two main channels how debt could affect economic growth. The first
channel is through its effects on private savings and private investment. The second channel is
through a loss of confidence. In both cases, the long-term interest rates play a crucial role.
The first channel works as follows. If the government borrows more, the private sector
lends more money to the government instead of either lending it to the private sector, which
is said to be more efficient or instead of consuming it. So, GDP decreases, because less
efficient investments are made and consumption decreases. The finding in the model, that
long-term interest rates rise due to a debt shock support the reasoning, because it makes the
government bonds more attractive, this crowds out private investment and households have a
higher incentive to save. But this scenario only happens if credit demand exceeds credit supply.
If the economy is in a recession and there are more savings in the economy than credit is
demanded, the additional spending of the government boosts economic growth. This situation
is well known as the Keynesian deficit spending. In the Eurozone, there are currently high
savings, very low interest rates and the economy suffers from a so-called secular stagnation,
so public investments are not expected to crowd out private investments. Consequently, this
channel cannot be the explanation behind the fall in GDP due to higher public debt here.
The second channel is the interrelations between debt, growth and interest rates. So, even
though there is more credit supply than credit demand in the market, long-term interest rates
rise, because the government looses its credibility to be able to pay back its debt. The reaction
of the market is obvious, the price of the bonds rises, because they are riskier. When the price
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of government bonds rises, also other interest rates rise, see [Zoli, 2013], and again, private
investment and private consumption decreases and so does GDP. This loss of credibility is also
the reasoning behind non-linear effects. Until a certain debt-to-GDP ratio, the government
might be little risky and after a threshold, the debt burden is so high that the risk increases
excessively. As mentioned in the literature review, a general threshold is not found. The turning
point, when the markets looses confidence is situative and individual. However, when bond
prices increase it is the role of the central bank to intervene in the market and buy the bonds
until its price decreases again. The ECB used to be quite restricted though. In the Eurozone,
there is the principle that nobody should pay the debt of others, so the ECB only started to buy
bonds in 2012, when the crisis became very severe. Furthermore, Mario Draghi calmed down
the market with his most famous citation: ”whatever it takes“, saying that the ECB will do
everything possible to keep everyone in the Eurozone. As long as a country is in the Eurozone,
its government bonds are fairly safe. The remaining risk is that a country leaves because it wants
to or because the conflict with the EU becomes insuperable. Thinking about the Greek sovereign
debt crisis or the Italian budget conflict, the political conflict with the EU is the biggest risk of
a member country. Higher debt usually leads to such a conflict, because either the maximum of
60% debt-to-GDP ratio or of the 3% primary deficit is exceeded. Once both parties agreed, the
bond prices decreased again.
The third result is that spillovers from core to periphery and vice versa exist. The
transmissions of growth are caused by the common market and the common currency. The
stronger result though is that debt in one area is harming growth in the other. The channels has
to be the same as discussed above for the whole Eurozone, but here, national debt is not only
affecting national private consumption, investment and national bond prices but of the whole
Eurozone. Also, the political conflict of one member state with the EU is affecting others. If
one country leaves the Eurozone during a crisis, it might hurt all other countries and in addition,
the risk that others leave increases dramatically. An additional result is that periphery countries
do not absorb both internal and external shocks as good as core countries. This is reasonable,
because periphery countries used to have a less diversified economies, their bargaining power in
the EU is lower and they have higher macroeconomic imbalances such as higher debt-to-GDP
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ratios and higher inflation for example, which might cause the fact that they do nit absorb the
shocks as good as core countries.
The main resulting policy implication is that the strong imposition of rules all over the
Eurozone is important, because the actions of one country affect the others. Besides, periphery
countries respond more, so they could need a bit more support from the EU. Secondly, high
public debt is affecting growth and long-term interest rates have a noteworthy influence. A
resulting policy implication is to reduce debt. But when and how to do it is highly controversial.
[Blanchard and Leigh, 2013] argue that fiscal consolidation must take place if debt is very high
and they discuss arguments for and against fast fiscal consolidation. However, they conclude
that this decision is very individual for every country. Also [Barseghyan and Battaglini, 2016]
argue in a theoretical model that there is no one-size fits all austerity program. How to design
the least costly austerity program still needs to be found out. In addition, imposing rules such
as the maximum 60% debt-to-GDP ratio that nobody follows triggers the political conflict and
might be a reason for higher interest rates. New fiscal rules are worth of consideration.
In this paper, the focus was on debt and its effects. Amongst others, the effect of debt
on growth was studied. As already mentioned above, one avenue of further research is to
examine the channel of private and public investment, through which debt could affect growth.
Besides, one could also shift the focus to growth and its empirical determinants. In this case,
other variables would be of interest to explain growth, such as investment, human capital and
technology. Debt would be just one additional variable in this study about growth. It would be
interesting to see if debt also has an influence on growth in this framework.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Granger causality table
Table 5: Granger causality
Debt-to-GDP
ratio
GDP
growth
Inflation Long-term
interest rate
Short-term
interest rate
Debt-to-GDP
ratio
7 3 7 7
GDP growth 3 7 3 7
Inflation 7 7 3 3
Long-term
interest rates
7 7 3 7
Short-term
interest rates
3 7 3 3
Source: Own calculations. Data: Eurostat.
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7.2 Complete IRFs of the 5-variate model
Figure 7: Complete IRFs of the 5-variate model
(a) Reactions to a debt shock
(b) Reactions to a debt shock
(c) Reactions to an inflation shock
(d) Reactions to a long-term interest rate shock
(e) Reactions to a short-term interest rate shock
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
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7.3 Complete IRFs of the four spillover models
Figure 8: Complete IRFs of debt spillovers from core to periphery countries
(a) Reactions to a debt shock in
the core countries
(b) Reactions to a debt shock in
the periphery countries
(c) Reactions to a growth shock
in the periphery countries
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
Figure 9: Complete IRFs of growth spillovers from core to periphery countries
(a) Reactions to a growth shock
in the core countries
(b) Reactions to a debt shock in
the periphery countries
(c) Reactions to a growth shock
in the periphery countries
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
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Figure 10: Complete IRFs of debt spillovers from periphery to core countries
(a) Reactions to a debt shock in
the periphery countries
(b) Reactions to a debt shock in
the core countries
(c) Reactions to a growth shock
in the core countries
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
Figure 11: Complete IRFs of growth spillovers from periphery to core countries
(a) Reactions to a growth shock
in the periphery countries
(b) Reactions to a debt shock in
the core countries
(c) Reactions to a growth shock
in the core countries
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
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7.4 IRFs with logged variables
Figure 12: Logged variables: IRFs of debt and GDP
(a) Logged variables: Reactions to a debt
shock
(b) Logged variables: Reactions to a GDP
shock
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
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Figure 13: Logged variables: IRFs to a debt shock
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
Figure 14: Logged variables: IRFs of debt
(a) Logged variables: Reaction to a
growth shock (b) Logged variables: Reaction to a inflation shock
(c) Logged variables: Reaction to a long-term
interest rate shock
(d) Logged variables: Reaction to a short-term
interest rate shock
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
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Figure 15: Logged variables: IRFs of periphery and core countries separately
(a) Logged variables: Reaction to a debt shock (b) Logged variables: Reaction to a GDP shock
(c) Logged variables: Reaction to a debt shock (d) Logged variables: Reaction to a GDP shock
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
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Figure 16: Logged variables: Spillovers from periphery to core countries
(a) Logged variables:
Reaction to a debt shock in the core
countries
(b) Logged variables:
Reaction to a growth shock in the core
countries
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
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Figure 17: Logged variables: Spillovers from core to periphery countries
(a) Logged variables:
Reaction to a debt shock in the
periphery countries
(b) Logged variables:
Reaction to a growth shock in the
periphery countries
Black solid line: orthogonalized IRF, red dashed lines 95%- and blue dashed lines 68%-confidence bands.
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7.5 Detailed data description
Description Unit Code Frequency
General government debt % of GDP gov 10q ggdebt quarterly
GDP Current prices, million euro namq 10 gdp quarterly
Long-term interest rates % irt lt mcby q quarterly
Short-term interest rates % irt st q quarterly
Inflation % change prc hicp manr monthly
GDP growth in relation to same quarter last year
For example, the growth rate of the first quarter in 2000 is given by:
GDPgrowth2000Q1 =
GDP2000Q1 −GDP1999Q1
GDP1999Q1
Quarterly inflation
For example the inflation rate for the first quarter in 2000 is given by:
Inflation2000Q1 =
Inflation2000M1 + Inflation2000M2 + Inflation2000M3
3
The resulting data are thus described as follows:
Description Unit Frequency
GDP growth % change quarterly
Inflation % change quarterly
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